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Major League Baseball (MLB) is the most prominent organization of professional 
baseball, the oldest of the four major sport leagues in the United States and Canada. Baseball was 
founded during the mid-1800’s, most likely during or shortly before the American Civil War. 
Teams began organizing in the 1870’s and played professionally in semi-organized leagues until 
the creation of the National and American Leagues, formed in 1876 and 1901, respectively. Both 
leagues served and operated as separate entities until they were merged into a single 
organization, Major League Baseball, in 2000. Major League Baseball, as of 2016, is composed 
of thirty franchises located in major cities across the United States and Canada, with fifteen in 
both the National League and American League. These thirty teams each play 162-game 
schedules, starting in the spring and ending in early October, followed by several weeks of what 
is known as the “postseason”, ultimately completed by the World Series, a best-of-seven games 
championship series between the best team in each league. “America’s Pastime”, as it is known, 
is the most popular sport in the United States in terms of annual attendance. It is beloved by 
many, from the youngest of children, to the oldest of fans; winning the World Series is 
paramount for these fans. To the owners of these thirty franchises, winning the World Series is 
the objective for each season, however, there is one goal that is sought after slightly more: 
profits. 
Owners of these franchises are more than just fans of baseball, they are investors in it. In 
a game that has been the pinnacle of American life for over a century, the sport is now beginning 
to see players make annual amounts that only Jay Gatsby knew of when the game’s popularity 
first took off in the Roarin’ Twenties. The easiest way for an MLB franchise to make revenues is 
to draw crowds; teams located in large markets such as New York City, Los Angeles, Boston and 
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Chicago have no trouble with ballpark attendance, regardless of team win-loss records and 
number of championships. Franchises located in cities outside of these large markets, such as 
Oakland, Tampa Bay, Cleveland, Kansas City, and Minneapolis all require consistent winning to 
maintain respectable attendance numbers.  
Winning consistently in Major League Baseball is much harder, especially for smaller 
market teams, than it is in other professional sport leagues. This is because Major League 
Baseball is the only of the four major sports to lack a salary cap and salary floor. A salary cap is 
a competitive balance restriction that forces franchises to spend below a fixed dollar amount 
every year on their roster. Most leagues use what is known as a “hard-cap”, which restricts teams 
from spending any amount over the agreed upon limit. Major League Baseball, however, 
implements what is known as a “luxury tax”, or competitive balance tax. Similar to a “soft-cap”, 
there is an agreed upon “cap” each year that teams are allowed to spend up to for their players’ 
salaries. If a club spends above this threshold, they are faced with a tax on the amount in which 
they exceed. This tax rate increases if a team violates the cap regularly; first time offenders in a 
five-year stretch pay 22.5% of the excess, second time offenders pay 30%, and third time 
offenders pay a massive 50%. The luxury tax is an incentive to most teams in Major League 
baseball to not spend over the cap, however, that does not stop some teams. Lucrative franchises 
such as the New York Yankees, Boston Red Sox, and Los Angeles Dodgers have violated the 
soft-cap multiple times from 2003-2014, twelve times, six times, and two times, respectively. A 
salary floor is a minimum amount that must be spent on the team as a whole; the only 




The lack of a salary cap is important in baseball, especially as salaries increase 
exponentially. After each season concludes, players with expired contracts become free agents. 
Free agents are, as the name suggests, free and independent from a team. This allows these 
players to sign with whichever team offers them a contract prior to the next season. Players, 
naturally, almost always sign with the highest bidder. This allows teams like the Yankees, Red 
Sox, and Dodgers to remain competitive almost each and every year, as they can spend the top 
dollar on the best available player(s) and have little to no fear of being outbid. There is one piece 
in particular which helps somewhat balance free agency known as the qualifying offer.  
A qualifying offer is a one-year contract set every year to an amount equal to the average 
of the top 125 annual salaries in baseball. These can be offered to players with newly expired 
contracts only by the team who the player had just played for prior. The exception to this is if a 
player is traded midseason; a player traded midseason is not eligible to receive a qualifying offer 
the following offseason. If accepted, the player remains with the club for another year and gets 
paid the set amount. If declined, the player becomes a free agent and can sign with any club who 
offers a contract. However, if the player signs with any team besides the one they had played for 
the prior year, the signing team forfeits its first round pick in the upcoming draft and the team 
losing said player receives a compensation pick sandwiched between the first and second round. 
This pick is significant as the first and second round are where the majority of the best young, 
amateur talent is drafted, thus placing a high value on these picks. This is important because 
teams typically do not offer qualifying offers except to the players they deem worth keeping at 
the set amount. If the player accepts, the team keeps the player. If the player declines, the team 
can still either negotiate a contract with the free agent or be compensated in the upcoming draft. 
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This process helps smaller market teams who have trouble keeping their top players due to salary 
limitations.  
Before a player can play in a game, he must be drafted in the First-Year Player Draft, 
held every June. There is an exception to this, however, as some players can be signed 
immediately without being drafted if they have played professionally internationally. Most 
typically, these players come from Asian and Latin American countries, most notably Japan, 
Cuba, and the Dominican Republic. In the draft, the thirty clubs of Major League Baseball select 
amateur players in reverse order of won-loss records from the previous regular season (the team 
with the worst record from the prior season selects first, followed by the team with the second 
worst record, and so on). After thirty selections, the “round” ends. The next round begins with 
teams selecting in the same order as the prior round. The First-Year Player Draft has up to forty 
rounds, with teams selecting in the same order round after round barring compensation picks or 
competitive balance picks. Competitive balance picks are picks granted to the ten smallest 
market teams or ten smallest revenue pools; these picks are placed after either the first or second 
rounds. These picks are the only picks in the draft that may be traded. 
The First-Year Player Draft is the primary way amateur players (high school, college, and 
non-professional baseball clubs) are assigned to its teams. To be eligible for the draft, the players 
must be a resident or have attended an educational institution in the United States, Canada, or a 
United States territory such as Puerto Rico. Other players, as mentioned above, are not subject to 
the draft. Players also must not have signed a major league or minor league contract to be 
eligible. High school players are only allowed to be drafted after graduation and before attending 
college, while college players are only eligible three years after initial enrollment; junior and 
community college players are eligible at any time. A player who is eligible to be selected in the 
Walton 5 
 
draft but is passed over by every club ultimately becomes a free agent, allowing them to sign 
with any club until said player enters or returns to college. 
Upon the completion of the draft, teams retain the rights of their selected players until 
either the player enters/returns to college or August 16. A player who is drafted but does not sign 
may be drafted again whenever they are eligible. When signed, players agree to a rookie 
contract; the monetary value of these contracts are typically close to league minimum salaries. 
Many players, typically those drafted in the first ten rounds, receive “signing bonuses”. These 
bonuses are essentially incentives for the player to sign with the team. Typically, the earlier a 
player is selected, the higher their signing bonus. However, the total amount teams can spend on 
signing bonuses per draft is on a budget. Each draft selection has its own “bonus slot”, with the 
value of these individual slots priced as a recommendation of what that pick deserves. Teams can 
spend more or less on these individual picks, however the total amount must stay in budget. This 
forces teams to be flexible yet creative with the amounts they give out as signing bonuses to 
certain players.  
Once the player is signed, the team has five years to call the player up to the Major 
Leagues from the Minor Leagues; if a player is not on a Major League roster within five years 
from being drafted, the player becomes a free agent. Once the player is called up, the “rookie 
contract” officially begins, starting a figurative clock until the player is eligible for free agency. 
On this rookie contract, the player essentially belongs to the club that drafted him for six years. 
The first half of the rookie contract is known as “pre-arbitration” years. In the pre-arbitration 
years of the player’s contract, the player receives a near league-minimum salary.  
Once a player plays through his pre-arbitration seasons, he then becomes eligible for 
salary arbitration. If a player chooses to go to salary arbitration, an impartial third party 
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ultimately decides what they will earn for the next season. This process is somewhat 
complicated, but essentially the team submits an amount they want to pay the player while the 
player decides what they deem they are worth. The arbitrator then decides which of the two 
salaries the player is worth and ultimately will be paid.  
Going to arbitration is simply a right a player has; the player is in no way forced to go 
through this process. Going to arbitration is usually a last resort when the player and team 
struggle to negotiate a deal. This process continues every season until the player hits free agency, 
unless the player and team come to an agreement before going to arbitration is needed. Teams 
can often “settle out of court” as well and sign players to a three-year contract to avoid 
arbitration altogether for the last remaining years before free agency. A player is “non-tendered” 
if cut from the team while on their rookie contract. When a team does this, they simply owe the 
player the money previously agreed upon for the rookie contract. If another team signs the player 
after they are cut, they also inherit the player’s arbitration status. 
As mentioned previously, when a player’s contract expires at the conclusion of a season, 
he becomes a free agent. As a free agent, the player is eligible to sign a contract with whichever 
team makes him an offer; these contracts have no maximum limits to their length or annual 
salary. Typically, players sign with whichever team offers the most money, however, some 
players are more attracted to longer contracts. Some players may also give what is called a 
“hometown discount”, meaning they sign a contract for less money because they like the 
organization, the city, etc.; these scenarios are somewhat rare, however. Due to the fact that 
many free agents simply seek the most money, many small market teams have trouble signing 
significant players and even struggle to retain their own free agents. This difficulty is a harsh 
reality to these teams and is evident through their activity at what is called the trade deadline. 
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The trade deadline, July 31 each season barring exceptions, is the final day in which 
teams can trade their players to other teams, most likely for other players or sometimes even 
salary relief. The return these teams often receive are prospects, typically players who have yet 
to reach the Major Leagues but are projected to someday reach that level. During July, many 
teams determine if they will be in playoff contention that season, and if not, often trade players 
on expiring contracts to teams in contention in hopes to receive prospects who can help in their 
future. Small market teams often practice this, as they are well aware they cannot afford their 
players once they hit free agency. By trading their players for prospects, they gain affordable 
players who can someday help them hopefully compete.  
This process is often a cycle for teams: the team drafts a player, develops them in the 
Minor Leagues and then keeps them while their contract is cheap for several years once they 
reach MLB, and ultimately trade them months before their contract expires and acquire younger, 
cheaper players to restart the same cycle. Due to this, drafting players is a crucial aspect to many 
team’s successes, especially those considered “small market”. Stellar drafting can help these 
teams develop talent into covetable assets to sell off to other desperate teams in return for 
valuable players to restart the process.  
II. Literature Review 
Research has been done over the past two decades to help tackle the issue of large-market 
teams essentially hoarding the majority of talent in Major League Baseball. From 1995 to 2001, 
teams with above-average payrolls won 98% of all postseason games (Krautmann, 2009). 
Although there hasn’t been a statistical outlier like that since, it is no coincidence that teams with 
above-average payrolls immediately have an advantage before even stepping on the field. In 
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order to control the problem, Major League Baseball has attempted to put numerous forms of 
competitive balance into place. Unlike the NFL, NBA, and NHL, MLB does not have a hard 
salary cap. Instead, Major League Baseball employs a luxury tax, essentially a slap on the wrist 
for large-market teams exceeding the cap. 
In 2002, Schmidt and Berri investigated the effect that competitive balance had had on Major 
League Baseball up to that point. In the late 1990’s, the Blue Ribbon Panel of Major League 
Baseball was asked to investigate this very question and concluded that competitive balance had 
deteriorated in the preceding years, meaning small-market teams were well aware going into the 
season that they had very little chance of truly competing. However, several economists were 
asked around the same time and believed the opposite was true: competitive balance was serving 
its purpose, allowing any and every team the equal chance to compete. To test these claims, 
Schmidt and Berri began by examining what defines a market size. The two believe there are 
several factors to help define market sizes: market population, income per capita of the market, 
and team payrolls. Team payroll was the factor they decided to narrow the most attention to. This 
is because teams that are able to afford a larger payroll are those that accumulate larger revenues 
and/or incomes.  
After reaching this conclusion, Schmidt and Berri began testing to see if there is a 
relationship between team wins and any of the factors. Population and income per capita were 
found to have no link, however, team revenues were linked to team wins. Despite this discovery, 
the relationship was found to not be truly consistent, meaning there could be other factors to 
examine in the future. Managerial ability is one factor to be considered, though this is a factor 
that is difficult to quantify (Schmidt and Berri, 2002). Following on this, Brown and Jepsen 
decided to examine what individual player statistics teams pay for and if certain teams pay more 
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for these players. Through their models, they discovered that players’ individual characteristics 
are significant predictors of pay. As expected, better players earn more money. Not surprisingly, 
teams with larger payrolls more often than not are the ones paying these players. However, 
Brown and Jepsen suggest that teams do not pay differently for these individual characteristics 
and statistics. Furthermore, they discover that arbitration eligible players receive greater salary 
increases when playing for wealthier teams. This is because arbitrators are not naïve and are well 
aware that these teams with larger payrolls can afford these players’ salary increases. In turn, 
arbitrators understand small-payroll teams may struggle to pay larger salaries, resulting in less of 
an increase for players employed by these teams. It is also uncovered that high revenue teams do 
not pay more per statistical unit than small revenue teams, however, they simply pay more of 
these players. This finding shows that small-market teams often have an equal chance of signing 
certain individual talent, though large-market teams ultimately end up with more of these players 
(Brown and Jepsen, 2009). 
In 2010, the effects of the luxury tax on competitive balance were tested by Dietl, Lang, and 
Werner. The luxury tax was intended to slow the growth of players’ salaries and ultimately 
prevent large-market teams from dominating. They found that higher luxury taxes induced small-
market clubs to increase their salaries (Dietl et al., 2010). Three years earlier, Solow and 
Krautmann found similar results, suggesting competitive balance slowed the growth of salaries. 
Their main focus was on revenue sharing, a competitive balance concept that essentially takes 
money from the richest teams and shares it with the poorest teams, attempting to equalize 
spending possibilities for all teams. Solow and Krautmann found that revenue sharing left teams 
mostly unaffected, however this redistribution did reduce salaries (Solow and Krautmann, 2007). 
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Lee and Fort examined the structure of competitive balance across the history of Major 
League Baseball. They look at different events that may have helped balance the league or shape 
the current concept of competitive balance. They found that certain events did in fact help 
competitive balance, such as access to international talent, television game diffusion, and the 
equalization of population centers. African Americans, Latin and Caribbean players, and Asian 
players were unable to play in Major League Baseball until the late 1940’s, the 1960’s, and mid-
1970’s, respectively. Access to these talents has aided competitive balance as teams are able to 
sign and play players from around the world. Television game diffusion has helped, albeit less 
significantly, as people across the country and world are able to view their favorite teams without 
being present at the game. Teams located outside of massive metropolitan areas such as New 
York, Los Angeles, and Chicago benefit as home-market populations are less important in 
determining viewership. Other possible factors that have assisted competitive balance are team 
relocations and expansion teams. Team relocations allow teams to reach untapped markets and 
gain fandom and viewership, while keeping a remaining fan-base in its prior home-city. Adding 
new franchises to the league through expansion creates more competition (Lee and Fort 2005). 
III. Theory and Hypothesis 
Competitive balance is an issue in every major sport, though Major League Baseball 
struggles significantly due to the lack of a salary cap. Understandably, the players’ union 
disagrees and refuses to allow a salary cap, as player salaries would most likely not only be 
slowed but halted altogether. Major League Baseball contrasts this as perfect competition is 
preferred though unrealistic. Prior research indicates that competitive balance measures such as 
the luxury tax and revenue distribution are somewhat effective, though they still do not 
completely solve the issue plaguing the league, specifically small-market teams. 
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If small-market teams are truly disadvantaged because of the lack of money, they must 
discover a way to gain ground. With a stalemate between the league and players’ union, these 
teams appear destined for failure year in and year out. Research can continue looking into 
competitive balance and different methods, however history has shown that the current methods 
put in place have little to no affect. One aspect in which teams are on a level playing field is 
through the draft. 
Small-market teams can attempt to compete with large-market teams simply by drafting 
better. This concept is obviously easier said than done, as some potential “can’t miss” players 
may injure themselves or simply never live up to their hype, while other lesser known players 
may emerge suddenly, therefore making the draft mostly unpredictable. What is fairly 
predictable though is that players selected earlier in the draft are more talented and therefore 
more likely to succeed, while the reverse is true for players selected in later rounds. The draft is 
designed knowing this fact, as the team with the worst record the previous season gets the first 
selection followed by the team with the second-worst record, so on and so forth. 
Besides skill and talent, there are other quantifiable factors that may help teams determine to 
choose certain players over others. Drafting a position player or pitcher is one possible 
determinant for teams. Handedness, whether it be for pitching or hitting must be considered, as 
well as if the player is being drafted out of high school or college. Certain scouts and front 
offices may hold preferences to these specific players and may draft accordingly. It is undeniable 
that team revenues and payrolls are significant to an extent in determining a team’s success. 
However, how a team drafts and uses their selections is more important in determining a team’s 
success. Accordingly, it is hypothesized that a team that trends to select certain players because 
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of certain factors such as position, handedness, and age (high school or college) will find greater 
draft success. 
IV. Data and Methodology  
The software that will be used to these hypotheses is Microsoft Excel 2016. The data that 
will be used for these hypotheses will be from the 2003-2008 Major League Baseball First-Year 
Player Drafts. These years were used as they are relevant to the league’s current structure. 2003 
was chosen as the first year to test as Michael Lewis’ Moneyball focused on Billy Beane and the 
2002 Oakland Athletics which revolutionized the way front offices evaluate talent. 2008 was 
used as the last draft to test players from because players with significant time in the Majors was 
preferred. Assuming it takes player two to three years to graduate to the Majors, these players 
would have reached MLB around 2010 or 2011. If this is the case, these players have an ample 
amount of experience and therefore data to test. 
 Data from the 2005-2014 seasons will also be used to test team performances. Every 
team’s payrolls from these years will also be used to examine the effect of team payrolls on 
performance. The other variable that will be used to examine team performance is the cumulative 
games per season from each team’s drafted players selected from 2003-2008. Each team’s 
respective games per season is derived through several calculations. First, the amount of games 
played by each individual player will be divided by the number of seasons each respective player 
has played in MLB. To negate the fact that pitchers appear in less games per season than position 
player, a weight is multiplied to the pitchers’ games per seasons to equalize the value with 
position players. The weight that was used was 2.468071; this number was calculated by 
dividing the average of all 2003-2008 drafted position players’ games per season by the average 
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of all 2003-2008 drafted pitchers’ games per season. These weighted numbers were totaled for 
every team. When testing team performance, one variable to often use is win-loss record. 
Although this is the most indicative way to measure a team’s performance, it does not entirely 
account for all factors. Instead, run differential for every team for each of the 2005-2014 seasons 
is used to quantify team annual performances. Run differential is more telling of how a team is 
performing over a long period of time; even though wins are the ultimate goals of teams, wins 
and losses are determined somewhat randomly. Run differential helps to better capture the 
underlying quality of teams. The thirty Major League teams and their respective run differentials 
per season, payroll per season (represented in millions), and games per season from drafted 




 In testing players from the 2003-2008 drafts, the variables mentioned before will be 
considered: selection number in the draft, whether the player was drafted out of high school or 
college, position (pitcher or fielding position), and handedness (throwing arm for pitchers, 
batting side for position players). The players that will be tested are those that have played in 
Major League Baseball; players drafted that have never played a game in the Majors are not 
included. Given these criteria, 1,101 players will be observed from the 2003-2008 MLB Drafts. 
Selection in the draft is deemed important as the earlier a player is drafted, the better they are 
expected to be. Age of the drafted player is important as some teams may value the youth of a 
high school player, believing the player to be raw and available to give more years to the 
organization. Some teams value college players more, as they are more likely to be experienced 
and developed, though they have more time on their bodies and may not be able to play as long 
as a player coming out of high school. Position is important as some teams may prefer 
stockpiling pitchers to position players or vice versa. Pitchers are often seen as more volatile 
assets, as arm injuries become more prominent due to the strain caused by pitching. Handedness 
of a pitcher is important because left handed pitchers are rarer due to a greater percentage of 
population being right handed. Handedness of a batter is significant to teams as left handed 
batters may be considered valuable to counter the greater amount of right hand pitchers in MLB.  
 These variables will first be tested in a regression model analyzing if the payroll per 
season and the games per season variables were significant in determining team success, and if 
so, to what extent. This test will be used to determine if team success, in the form of run 
differential per season, can come from a factor besides payroll per season. The equation that will 
be used for this test will be:  
𝑦 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑥1 + 𝛽2𝑥2 
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In this equation, the dependent variable, y, will represent run differential per season. Beta zero 
will be the intercept, representing the run differential a team would have if their respective 
payroll and games per season variables were equal to zero. X-one will represent the payroll per 
season variable and X-two will represent the games per season variable; Beta-one and Beta-two 
will represent the coefficients for their corresponding variables. 
If the games per season variable is deemed significant then another regression analysis will 
be conducted. This model will be used to determine what characteristics of a drafted player will 
be significant in leading to individual games played per season. The equation that will be used to 
test this will be: 
𝑦 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑥1 +  𝛽2𝑥2 +  𝛽3𝑥3 +  𝛽4𝑥4 
The dependent variable, y, in this model will represent a player’s individual games played per 
season. X-one will represent a player’s pick number in their respective draft, X-two will 
represent whether the player is a position player or pitcher, X-three will represent if the player 
was drafted out of high school or college, and X-four will represent handedness of the player 
(batting stance for position players, throwing hand for pitchers). Again, all four Beta’s will 
represent the coefficients that correspond to the respective variables. The last three variables in 
this equation are dummy variables: position players, high school draftees, and right handed 
players will be assigned values of zero, pitchers, college draftees, and lefties will be assigned 
values of one. In this case, Beta zero will be the intercept representing the games played per 
season expected from a player drafted with the zeroth pick (which cannot happen, therefore 
realistically representing players selected first overall) who are position players, drafted out of 
high school, and right-handed. Pitchers, college draftees, and left handers were given the one 
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value because it is believed these three variables will be more important to teams and result in 
more games played per season. 
 The expectations for these models and the results are to find that teams that draft well 
will lead to better run differentials, and therefore find more success. To prove this, it is expected 
that a team’s “games per season” variable will show to be significant in determining run 
differential. It is also expected that payroll will determine this, however this study hopes to find 
that the draft is the best way for teams with low payrolls to compete with those teams with larger 
payrolls. If these models prove results that correlate with expectations, then the hope for this 
study is to decipher what, if any, factors or characteristics of drafted players lead to careers with 
more games played. 
V. Results 
Upon conducting the first regression model testing what factors determine a team’s run 
differential, the following results were found: 
 
 
By observing the intercept found in the bottom chart, it is expected that a team with no payroll 
and no games per season from drafted players will have a run differential of -143.5. This is no 
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surprise, as a team must have players playing and subsequently a payroll to some extent to score 
and prevent runs. The p-values of the payroll variable proves its significance in determining run 
differential. Payroll per year is seen to be extremely important, as the p-value is a miniscule 
0.00011. With a coefficient of 1.00878, it is expected that with every million dollars of payroll a 
team spends, its respective run differential will increase by just over a run. The games per season 
variable is not statistically significant, with a p-value at 0.2638. With a coefficient of 0.0235, it is 
expected that every game per season a team receives from a drafted player, their run differential 
will increase by two-hundredths of a run. Though this effect seems small, it is not all too 
surprising as the average amount of games per season from drafted players for these teams across 
2005-2014 is around 1,930 games. Therefore, it is expected that a team with average games per 
season will have a run differential of just above 45 runs. Originally, a player’s total games 
variable was used rather than a player’s games per season, however this proved to be even less 
significant of a variable. Although the statistical significance of this variable was not as great as 
was expected, the results are in line with expectations, which motivates testing the second model. 
Upon testing the second equation, attempting to prove characteristics that affected a 





Observing the intercept in these results, it is expected that a right-handed position player chosen 
zeroth (first) overall out of high school would play 53 games per season. Two variables were 
proven to be statistically significant in this model: the pick in the draft and the handedness of the 
player. The significance of what pick in the draft a player was selected was expected to be very 
important, as players chosen earlier in the draft are expected to be better players and therefore 
play in more games. It is noted, however, that the coefficient is negative. This is also expected as 
the later a player is selected, the less play time is expected. The handedness of a player is not 
entirely surprising, as some teams do value left handed players more due to their rarity.  
 Although the first model showed that the Games per Season variable was statistically 
insignificant, the second model proved that there were multiple factors that could indicate a 
player’s success through certain characteristics. These findings and possible reasons for 
statistical insignificance will be discussed further in the next section. 
VI. Discussion 
In the previous section, the relationship between two separate independent variables and the 
dependent variable run differential per season were examined using a regression model. This 
model proved the relationship between a team’s run differential per season and its payroll to be 
statistically significant with a coefficient of just over one. This relationship essentially shows that 
every million dollars a team spends on payroll contributes to one positive run. This came as no 
surprise, as multiple analyses and researchers have concluded that large-market teams have an 
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advantage simply through the fact they can spend more on top talent. This relationship and its 
statistical significance proved our point that small-market teams are disadvantaged from the start. 
Through the evidence that payroll contributes heavily to a team’s success, the next step is to 
examine whether small-market teams can still compete. Our theory is that these teams can 
compete and ultimately succeed through the draft. The idea is that these teams will draft players 
that will play in Major League Baseball and contribute by playing in many games per season. 
Unfortunately, the model showed the relationship to be statistically insignificant, meaning the 
relationship is not necessarily accurate. However, this shortcoming could be for numerous 
reasons. 
First, many players do not play for the teams they are drafted by. As mentioned before, many 
players are used in trades, especially as prospects, and ultimately make their first Major-League 
roster with a team different than the one that drafted them. This commonality causes a skew in 
the data, as many players played their games with different teams across their career. Although 
we accounted for this possibility, we ran the model because we believed the idea that drafting a 
player that would successfully make the Majors and play in a significant amount of games did 
not rely solely on which teams they played for, but rather the fact alone that they played in 
games at the top-level. This idea essentially shows whether teams can scout talent and draft this 
talent.  
Another reason the relationship could prove to come up short is due to some organizations 
developing players in the minors better than others. Some organizations have a knack for turning 
unknown talent into quality big-leaguers, and vice versa. Unfortunately, this consideration is 
difficult to accurately quantify and unable to fit into a regression model for this reason. 
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One other factor that is difficult to quantify that could play a major role in a team’s success is 
leadership, both on and off the field. Leadership traits in players, managers, and front office 
personnel is nearly impossible to put into numerical values though it could contribute heavily to 
a team’s success. Managerial performance is a major factor in a team’s successes and/or failures 
and the inability to include this in a model is a definite limitation. 
Despite the statistical insignificance found in our data of player games per seasons 
contributing to a team’s run differential per season, a second model was conducted to examine 
several other relationships. This model made the games per season variable dependent upon four 
characteristics found in players being drafted. The pick in which a player is selected in the draft, 
their position, whether the player was drafted out of high school or college, and the handedness 
of a player were all determined to be possible factors that could influence their value to a team 
and whether the player would find success. 
This model was conducted because, although the games per season variable was found 
insignificant, we believe it is a stepping stone to future research. Determining factors that can 
help determine a drafted player’s likelihood of contributing playing time to the Major-League 
club is something worth researching and analyzing. 
After running the model, two variables were found to be statistically significant: a player’s 
selection number in the draft and their handedness. A player’s position and whether they were 
drafted out of high school or college proved insignificant in this model, however, both variables 




The significance of when in a draft a player is selected is far from surprising; players drafted 
earlier in the draft are typically considered the best players, hence their high selection. This 
statistical significance proves that players with better talent are more likely to find success in the 
future. This is a key point for unsuccessful teams, as these teams receive the top picks and 
ultimately have the best chance to select better players.  
With the significance of a relationship between “better players” and more games played per 
season, it is now important to determine what specific characteristics of drafted players lead to 
more games played. The handedness of players was determined to be the only statistically 
significant characteristic. This relationship shows that left handers are likely to play more games 
per season. Again, this relationship may be due to the rarity of left handed people in the world. In 
baseball, it is typical for left handed pitchers to be more sought after due to the lack of left 
handed players in general. Left handed batters are sought after because lefties typically fare 
better off of right handed pitchers, and vice versa. With a higher frequency of right handed 
pitchers across the league, left handed players are valuable to clubs. The coefficient of this 
variable through this model is just above five, meaning left handed players can be expected to 
play in five more games per season than right handers.  
The position of a drafted player was deemed insignificant through this model. One limitation 
to this data is that the players’ listed position is that of which when originally drafted. Many 
players experience position changes from the time they are drafted to when they play in Major 
League Baseball. This issue could have skewed the data and created inaccuracies when testing. 
This characteristic is one that should be tested further, however, as many teams prefer drafting 
pitchers over position players, or vice versa. Pitchers are often viewed as a “high-risk, high-
reward” type selection while position players are often safer bets. 
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Whether a player was drafted out of high school or college is the other variable to have been 
proven insignificant through the model. Like the previous variable, this data had its own 
limitation that most likely caused inaccuracies. In the data, players drafted who eventually 
played at least one game in Major League Baseball were tested. However, not every player in the 
dataset signed when originally drafted. Some players in the dataset were discovered to have been 
drafted again years later, often by a different team at a different selection number. Given this 
information, many players that were drafted out of high school went to college instead and later 
played in MLB after being drafted out of college years after their original selection. Due to time 
constraints, this inaccuracy was unfortunately ignored. 
These results prove to be valuable as they can be used as stepping stones for further research. 
The fact that payroll plays a significant role in a team’s success is nothing new, and this idea was 
only solidified through these analyses. The significance of how a team drafts was proven to 
affect how a team performs in the future, despite the statistical insignificance. However, this 
shortcoming may still be able to shed light on future research on this topic. 
In regards to drafting players, this research was proven valuable, identifying two factors that 
contributed positively to the expectations of a player’s career. A player’s scouted talent and 
handedness were proven to be indicators of a player’s amount of games played. The other two 
factors were proven insignificant, though for factors that could be accounted for in the future.  
VII. Conclusion 
The main objective of this study was to determine a way for a small-market team to 
compete in a game where large-market teams can so easily dominate. Through research of 
past studies, the idea that these teams can draft better and ultimately field better teams for 
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less payroll came to fruition. By drafting better, these teams could control these players on 
cheap, rookie contracts and employ these players until the contracts expire. This concept is 
very common in today’s game thanks to Michael Lewis’ Moneyball and can be seen in use 
by many successful small market teams. Unfortunately, the tests used in this study did not 
prove this concept, though could be a potential building block for future research.  
 This study found many limitations throughout the research and models that may have 
contributed to the statistical significance observed in the first test. Two obvious limitations for 
this specific study were time and money. A lack of money to acquire more extensive data and a 
lack of time to properly account for external factors led to this statistical insignificance. Another 
issue with these tests were the duplicates and inaccuracies in the characteristics of the players 
tested. The years 2003-2008 were used when observing the drafted players to help analyze how 
teams drafted after the 2002 Oakland Athletics season, the subject of Moneyball. 2008 was used 
as the last year due to many players drafted in the following years not having had enough time in 
the Major Leagues to properly test this theory. Due to using these specific years, many players 
drafted in 2009 and later were included if previously drafted in the tested years, subsequently 
affecting the results. 
 Another issue was the fact that a relatively small sample size was used. Although testing 
1,101 different players is no small feat, there are simply decades of drafts that can be analyzed 
before 2003 to help test this hypothesis. Again, the specific years in this study were used for a 
reason, however, testing over a broader period would possibly yield better results. 
 One possible shortcoming of this model is the “games per season” variable that was used. 
This variable is not entirely indicative of the magnitude of a player’s performance rather a simple 
count of how many games a player appears on average per season across their career. This 
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number is a decent indicator of success, assuming players with more games played are typically 
better players. However, using actual performance measures could help this study progress. This 
idea was tested in this very study. The top 300 players from the study in regards to “games per 
season” were tested again, except instead of using games per season as the variable of interest, 
their career Wins Above Replacement (WAR) values were used. WAR is a commonly used stat 
to value all aspects of a player’s performance. One unit of WAR essentially equates to one win 
that the player’s team would not have won without that player. Therefore, the higher the WAR, 
the better. A new model was conducted, using these 300 players’ WAR’s instead of games per 
season. To our surprise, the statistical significance was less using WAR. However, this could be 
explained due to the even smaller sample size. Again, time and money unfortunately made 
acquiring all 1,101 players’ WAR’s difficult and unrealistic. However, future research into this 
topic using a larger sample of WAR could yield dividends. 
 Although this study failed in proving how small-market teams can find success against 
large-market teams, it built a foundation for future study into the topic. Countering the 
limitations this study encountered and using better performance measures are just several ways 
in which future research can build upon this. The ability to quantify different factors such as 
leadership are other ways this study can be enhanced to accumulate success. This study did in 
fact show two characteristics teams can look to exploit when drafting to increase the likelihood 
of a player’s games per season. 
 If greater financial resources were available, the next step to better this research would be 
to acquire data with more performance measures and better programs to test and run models 
more quickly and efficiently. These capabilities would allow for the testing of a greater sample 
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